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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief 
Abstract. This paper critically examines currently influential transparency 
accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions 
of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world.  For 
example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-
ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one 
believes that premise.  This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-
ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without 
believing the premise, and so you cannot infer from a premise that you 
believe the premise unless you do believe it.  I argue that this procedure 
cannot be a source of justification, however, because one can be justified 
in inferring from p that q only if p amounts to strong evidence that q is 
true.  This is incompatible with the transparency account because p often 
is not very strong evidence that you believe that p.  For example, unless 
you are a weather expert, the fact that it will rain is not very strong 
evidence that you believe it will rain.  After showing how this intuitive 
problem can be made precise, I conclude with a broader lesson about the 
nature of inferential justification:  that inferential transitions between 
beliefs, when justified, must be underwritten by evidential relationships 
between the facts or propositions which those beliefs represent. 
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1.  Introduction 
You can know what you believe without appealing to the sort of evidence you would 
need in order to know what another person believes.  For example, you might know that 
you believe that there will be a third world war, even though you have never heard 
yourself say so out loud.  And you might know that you believe the capital of North 
Dakota is Bismark, even though nothing about your recent behavior would distinguish 
you from someone who has forgotten what the capital of North Dakota is.  How do you 
know these things about yourself? 
One familiar proposal is that you know your own beliefs by deploying an ‘inner sense’—
a faculty of perception somehow comparable to ordinary perceptual faculties, but directed 
inward rather than outward.  According to a number of recent theorists, however, it is a 
mistake to invoke the notion of perception to explain your knowledge of your own 
beliefs.  To answer the question ‘Do I believe that p?’, these theorists claim, there is no 
need to “look inward” to examine or observe your own mind.  Instead you need only 
“look outward” onto the world, and answer the question ‘Is it the case that p?’.  If you 
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look outward to find that it will rain, for example, then you can self-ascribe the belief that 
it will rain on the basis of what you have found.    In the form of a common slogan, the 1
proposal is that questions about one’s own beliefs are transparent to questions about the 
mind-independent world.   2
Although many theorists are attracted to this rough and suggestive slogan, not everyone 
who likes the slogan understands its meaning in quite the same way.  For simplicity, we 
can focus on a specific commitment shared by a number of views whose differences are 
for our purposes inessential.  Let’s say (stipulatively) that p is a good reason for you to 
believe that q if you either already are in a position justifiably to believe that q on the 
basis that p, or if you would be in such a position if you were to learn that p.  For 
example, if you know that the barometer in the garage is working properly, then the fact 
that the barometer reads ‘low’ will be a good reason for you to believe that the barometric 
pressure is low in the absence of further evidence to the contrary.  We can now represent 
the claim that questions about one’s beliefs are transparent to questions about the world 
schematically as follows: 
Transparency:   p is a good reason for you to believe that you believe that 
p.   3
!  Related proposals have been suggested concerning knowledge of mental states other than beliefs.  For 1
proposals concerning knowledge of one’s own perceptual experiences, see (Byrne, 2010), (Dretske, 1994 
and 1995, Ch. 2), (Evans, 1982), and (Tye, 2002), and for critical discussion see (Aydede, 2002) and 
(Lycan, 1999).  For proposals concerning desire and intention, see (Byrne, 2011 and forthcoming a), and 
(Setiya, 2011).  For epistemic states like justified belief and knowledge, see (Gibbons, 2006, pp. 32-33) and 
(McHugh, 2010).  It is controversial whether we should expect an account of self-knowledge to be uniform 
across these cases, and it may be that a transparency-based explanation is correct in some cases but not 
others.  For discussion, see (Boyle, 2009 and 2011), (Byrne, 2011, Sec.  5 and forthcoming a, Sec.  3), 
(Cassam, 2011), and (Schwitzgebel, forthcoming).
!  See, e.g., (Cassam, 2011), (Moran, 2001), (Shah and Velleman, 2005).  Other theorists express a similar 2
idea by saying that beliefs are transparent to the world.  Although the term of art ‘transparency’ often is 
associated with Evans’ influential discussion of belief self-ascription (1983, pp. 225-227), Evans himself 
did not use the term.  Sometimes ‘transparency’ is used instead to denote an (alleged) property of 
experiences (a.k.a., ‘diaphanousness’).  See, e.g., (Stoljar, 2004) and (Tye, 2002).
!  With minor, largely terminological differences, Transparency is endorsed by Byrne (2005, Sec.  7), 3
Gallois (1996), and Shoemaker (2009, pp. 37-39)—although Byrne’s focus is knowledge rather than 
justification.  Other attributions are less straightforward.  Moran (2001 pp. 62-63), offers two formulations 
of what he calls “the claim of transparency” that are not obviously equivalent to one another.  The first, 
following Edgley (1969, p.  90), is that “from within the first-person perspective, I treat the question of my 
belief about P as equivalent to the question of the truth of P”.  The second, which follows Evans, is that “a 
first-person present-tense question about one’s belief is answered by reference to (or consideration of) the 
same reasons that would justify an answer to the corresponding question about the world.” I think both of 
these proposals face difficulties along the lines of those I discuss here, but to avoid redundancy I will not 
argue the point.  For further examples of the proposal that you can be justified in self-ascribing the belief 
that p on the basis of evidence for p, rather than on the basis of p itself, see (Fernández, 2003 and 2005) and 
(Williams, 2007), and for critical discussion see (Vahid, 2005), (Way, 2007), and (Zimmerman, 2004). 
Setiya (2011) and Silins (2012) disavow what I call ‘Transparency’ in favor of closely related alternatives, 
while Boyle (2011) favors an alternative view whose relationship to Transparency is more distant.  For 
discussion of (Peacocke, 1998), whose account of consciously based self-ascriptions is a precursor of 
recent transparency accounts, see (Coliva, 2008), (Martin, 1998), and (Zimmerman, 2006).
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Despite its attractions, which we will consider shortly, Transparency can appear puzzling 
because it does not fit with our ordinary understanding of what a good reason (or basis) 
for belief is.  To a first approximation, we usually think that p is a good reason for you to 
believe that q only if p amounts to strong evidence that q is true.  This conception of 
epistemic reasons does not sit well with Transparency, because p often is not very strong 
evidence that you believe that p.  For example, unless you are some kind of hyper-expert 
about the weather, who can be counted on not to be ignorant of whether it will rain, the 
fact that it will rain is not very strong evidence that you believe it will rain. 
Transparency has been gaining traction in recent discussions of self-knowledge, and this 
evidentialist objection, which this paper will develop in greater detail, is arguably its 
most pressing difficulty.    But there is a further reason why this objection to Transparency 4
deserves of our attention.  As we will see, it lies at the fault line between competing 
conceptions of inferential justification, one of which gives explanatory priority to 
inferential relations between one’s beliefs, and the other of which gives priority to 
evidential relations between the objects of those beliefs.  So it is no small matter whether 
Transparency, and the corresponding conception of inferential justification, can be 
sustained in the face of its most pressing difficulty. 
After outlining some of the key motivations for Transparency in Section 2, in Section 3 
we will set aside a worry to which the Transparency theorist may have an effective reply, 
and take away a broader lesson about a theory of inferential justification which supports 
Transparency.  Then in Section 4, we will consider a series of specific difficulties for 
Transparency, which I take to clarify and reinforce the intuitive puzzle.  In Section 5 we 
will take a step back and consider a broader lesson about the nature of inferential 
justification:  that inferential transitions between beliefs, when justified, must be 
underwritten by evidential relationships between the facts or propositions which those 
beliefs represent. 
2.  Motivations for Transparency 
One motivation for Transparency is that it fits neatly with a popular idea about the 
relationship between rationality and self-knowledge.  As G.  E.  Moore famously 
observed, it seems somehow inappropriate (or “absurd”) to assert propositions of the 
form <p, but I don’t believe that p>.    Many subsequent theorists have thought we should 5
go further, and countenance as irrational combinations of attitudes with a broadly Moore-
paradoxical character.  More specifically, these latter-day Moorean theorists have urged 
us to accept claims like the following: 
!  See, e.g., (Boyle, 2011), (Gallois, 1996), (Martin, 1998, pp. 117-118), (Moran, 2003, p.  413), (Silins, 4
2012), and especially Byrne’s (2005, Sec.  7.2) discussion of “the puzzle of transparency.”  We will 
consider some of these discussions in Section 4.
!  For a helpful review, see (Green and Williams, 2007).5
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Moorean Irrationality:  (1) It is irrational to believe that you believe that 
p if you do not believe that p, and (2) It is irrational to doubt   that you 6
believe that p if you do believe that p. 
To better understand Moorean Irrationality, it will help to consider what its proponents 
allege is an important difference between introspective knowledge of your own beliefs 
and proprioceptive knowledge of your bodily states such as the state of having your legs 
crossed.  According to the Moorean, the state of jointly believing that p and yet doubting 
that you believe that p manifests a kind of internal incoherence among your doxastic 
attitudes which is allegedly the mark of irrationality.    In contrast, the state of having your 7
legs crossed and yet doubting that you have your legs crossed does not manifest an 
incoherence among your attitudes for the simple reason that the state of having your legs 
crossed is not a doxastic attitude. 
To see why Moorean Irrationality is a close cousin of Transparency, we need to introduce 
a bit of jargon.  Let’s say, roughly and approximately, that believing that p rationally 
requires you to believe that q if you are in a situation where it is irrational for you to 
doubt that q if you believe that p, but where it could be rational for you to doubt that q if 
you doubt that p.    It arguably follows from Moorean Irrationality that 8
Moorean Requirements:  Believing that p rationally requires you to 
believe that you believe that p.   9
There is a close affinity between Moorean Requirements and Transparency.    When we 10
consider paradigmatic examples in which the belief that p rationally requires the belief 
that q, it also is true that p is a good reason to believe that q—that one could be justified 
in believing that q on the basis that p.  For example, given the right background evidence 
the belief that it will rain might rationally require you to believe that a tennis match will 
be cancelled.  And given the very same background evidence, it seems that you would 
then be justified in believing that the match will be cancelled on the basis that it will rain. 
!  I take doubting that p to mean either disbelieving or actively withholding belief from p.  Someone who 6
fails to believe that p merely because they have never considered whether p does not doubt that p in this 
sense.
!  See, e.g., (Christensen, 2007) and (Zimmerman, 2008).7
!  This first pass gloss on rational requirements is complicated by cases where one’s attitude to p is itself 8
irrational.  We will consider such cases in greater detail in Section 4.2 below.
!  Moorean Requirements follows from Moorean Irrationality on the plausible assumption that if it is 9
irrational for you to believe that q then it is rational for you to doubt that q.  See the discussion of the 
Existence thesis in Barnett (MS a) for more.
!  For related discussion, see (Fernández, 2005a), (Moran, 2001, pp. 69-77), (Shoemaker, 2009, pp. 37-39), 10
(Silins, 2012), (Smithies, 2012 and forthcoming), (Williams, 2007), and (Zimmerman, 2008).
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Nevertheless, the Moorean might have room for a fallback position that avoids 
Transparency by distinguishing between propositions that serve as good reasons for a 
given belief and propositions which if believed would rationally require that belief.  One 
strategy for doing so is to distinguish rational requirement from justification, and to say 
that what rationally requires a belief need not in doing so justify that belief.    This move 11
could avoid the implication from Moorean Requirements to Transparency because it 
allows us to say that belief that p rationally requires belief that one believes that p without 
justifying belief that one believes that p.  But it would do so at the cost of severing the 
explanation of how self-ascriptions are justified from considerations involving Moore’s 
paradox in a way that some Mooreans might find unsatisfying.  Another strategy is to 
distinguish instead between two ways in which believing that p might justify believing 
that q, a reason-providing way and another as yet unexplained way.  When believing that 
p justifies believing that q in the typical reason-providing way, the fact or proposition that 
p is a good reason or basis on which to believe that q, and one’s believing that p justifies 
believing that q by providing one with that reason.  But perhaps there is some other way 
that the belief that p might confer justification onto the belief that one believes that p—a 
way that does not involve providing one with reasons on whose basis one can believe that 
one believes that p.    This strategy avoids whatever difficulties Transparency might face, 12
but only by offering us little positive insight into the nature of introspective justification. 
Once it is conceded that the belief that p does not justify the belief that one believes p in 
the way that beliefs usually can confer justification on other beliefs, it is unclear what 
explanatory value remains to the claim that beliefs justify their own self-ascriptions, for it 
is unclear what grip we have on the notion of a belief justifying another belief apart from 
our grip on the conventional reason-providing kind of justifying.  To be sure, many 
philosophers have proposed views under which mental states other than beliefs—such as 
perceptual experiences—can justify beliefs, just as other beliefs can.  If we are open to 
the possibility of non-beliefs justifying beliefs, then perhaps we also should be open to 
beliefs justifying other beliefs in unconventional ways.  However, the most prevalent and 
plausible theories of perceptual justification are ones that try to assimilate justification by 
perceptual experience to the conventional, reason-giving sort of justification that usually 
comes from beliefs, and show us how these can be two related species of a common 
genus.    It is possible that the same could be done by the Moorean, but in the absence of 13
!  Avnur (2012) adopts a position like this, but in a very different context.  On Avnur’s view, it is possible 11
for our ordinary beliefs to rationally require beliefs in the negations of skeptical hypotheses without thereby 
justifying those beliefs.
!  I take this, in outline, to be Silins’ (2012) strategy, although on his view it is the judgement that p, rather 12
than the belief that p, that justifies the belief that one believes that p.  Although Silins characterizes his view 
as an elaboration of the slogan that the question whether you believe that p is transparent to the question 
whether p, on his construal the slogan is consistent with a wide variety of theories about belief-self 
ascription, including an inner sense theory.  Jim Pryor and Declan Smithies have suggested similar ideas to 
me in conversation.
!  See Pryor (2005) for a critical discussion of attempts to assimilate perceptual justification to justification 13
by beliefs via what Pryor calls the ‘Premise Principle’.
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a convincing account we should not take this for granted.  Just because the phenomenon 
of reason-providing justification between one belief and another is one we have a grip on, 
we cannot take it for granted that we also have have a grip on what it would mean for one 
belief to justify another in the unconventional way that the Moorean proposes. 
A second motivation for Transparency draws on a theory about the psychological process 
underlying typical self-ascriptions of belief.  Where an inference is understood to be the 
occurrent process of reasoning by which one forms the standing attitude of believing a 
conclusion on the basis of a reason or premise, Alex Byrne recently has proposed the 
striking theory that 
Transparent Inferences:  Typical psychological transitions from a belief 
that p to a belief that one believes that p are inferences.   14
Byrne’s guiding idea is the observation that ordinary reasoning and the introspective self-
ascription of belief have an important feature in common:  namely, both involve forming 
new beliefs in a manner that is sensitive to one’s preexisting beliefs.  Since a capacity for 
reasoning and inference is necessary to explain much of our knowledge of the external 
world, Transparent Inferences is alleged to provide an economical explanation of the 
reliability of our ordinary self-ascriptions of belief—an explanation which, in contrast to 
the allegedly extravagant inner sense theory, posits no psychological mechanisms for 
detecting one’s beliefs beyond those required for psychological capacities other than 
introspection. 
It is natural to think that if we accept Transparent Inferences then we also must accept 
Transparency.  Since our typical self-ascriptions of belief are justified, we will be 
committed to Transparency if we accept the descriptive claim that we do typically infer 
from p that we believe that p and yet deny Transparency.  But there might be room for a 
fallback position that rejects this descriptive claim in favor of the closely related claim 
that 
Redeployment of Reasoning:  Typical psychological transitions from a 
belief that p to a belief that one believes that p redeploy the psychological 
mechanisms ordinarily deployed in making inferences. 
Unlike Transparent Inferences, which concerns the reasons or basis on which you 
typically self-ascribe beliefs, Redeployment of Reasoning speaks only of the the 
psychological mechanisms that are responsible for generating self-ascriptions.  These 
kinds of claims arguably can come apart in cases where psychological mechanisms 
!  See especially (Byrne, 2005, Sec.  7).  Byrne’s proposal was anticipated by Gaillois’ (1996) doxastic 14
schema, and by a distinct but closely related proposal from Fernández (2003, 2005b).  Despite some 
important differences, Peacocke’s (1998) account of consciously based self-ascriptions might be interpreted 
along the same lines.
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typically deployed to serve one function are deployed to serve a different function, as the 
Redeployment of Reasoning theorist claims for cases of belief self-ascription. 
Although this fallback position is able to avoid commitment to Transparency and the 
epistemic consequences that come with it, it does so only by severing the epistemology of 
self-ascriptions from their psychological explanation.  This will be unsatisfying to many 
theorists, who wish to connect Moorean intuitions about the epistemology of self-
ascriptions to an account of the psychological process by which we arrive at them. 
What is more, the alleged psychological economy of the Redeployment of Reasoning 
hypothesis is a thin empirical basis for its acceptance.  Even if we accept explanatory 
economy as a desiderata for psychological explanations, Redeployment of Reasoning is 
not the only game in town when it comes to redeploying for the sake of belief self-
ascription cognitive mechanisms that ordinarily subserve other functions.  For just one 
alternative, consider the Ryle-inspired theory that we know what we think in part by 
“hearing” our own “silent soliloquies.”    On a theory like this, we often know what we 15
believe by the production and monitoring of speech-like mental imagery that is facilitated 
by the same psychological mechanisms that usually subserve the production and 
reception of real speech.  Although this Ryle-inspired theory involves the redeployment 
of existing psychological faculties to subserve belief self-ascription, it does not involve 
the redeployment of one’s reasoning faculties in the way imagined by the transparency 
theorist. 
There is furthermore room to worry that the economy of the redeployment theorist’s 
explanation has been oversold.  If psychological mechanisms deployed in ordinary 
inference are redeployed for the purposes of belief self-ascription, these mechanisms 
must somehow be insulated from the broader psychological profile that accompanies 
ordinary inferences.  First, for reasons that we will see in Section 4, the disposition to 
deploy these mechanisms in the service of belief self-ascription must be insulated from 
dispositions to reason hypothetically and to increase one’s confidence in the conclusion 
of an inference continuously with increases in confidence in the premise.  Second, when 
the psychological mechanisms for belief self-ascription are deployed, they must be 
prevented from leading to the standing psychological state of believing that one believes 
that p on the basis that p.  Suppose for illustration that I believe on Monday that it will 
rain on Tuesday, and that this belief leads me to believe both that I believe on Monday 
that it will rain on Tuesday and also that the tennis match will be cancelled on Tuesday. 
Since my inference from the premise that it will rain to the conclusion that the match will 
be cancelled leaves me in the standing mental state of believing the conclusion on the 
basis of the premise, if I later go on to revise my belief that it will rain, I also will revise 
!  Ryle’s suggestion appears in (1949, pp. 181-185), but see (Carruthers, 2011) for a more recent 15
development of the idea and(Byrne,2012 and forthcoming b) for helpful commentary.  Seealso (Gordon, 
2007), who proposes an alternative explanation in which our faculties for producing speech are redeployed 
in a different way to subserve belief self-ascription.
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my belief that the tennis match will be cancelled.    I will not revise, however, my belief 16
that I believed on Monday that it will rain on Tuesday, because the psychological process 
that led me to the self-ascription, whatever it was, does not typically leave one in the 
standing mental state of believing that one believes that p on the basis that p.  Without a 
better understanding of the psychology of ordinary reasoning than anyone currently has, 
it remains a highly speculative matter how economically this can be accomplished. 
A final common source of motivation for Transparency comes from considering 
examples.  While I think this source of motivation runs into problems, there are different 
kinds of problems with different kinds of examples.  Here we will confine ourselves to 
one especially influential example.  In his discussion of self-knowledge, Gareth Evans 
remarked that 
[I]n making a self ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or 
occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world.  If someone asks 
me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I must attend, in 
answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would 
attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world 
war?’.   17
While Evans’ description of the example is plausible, we should be cautious about 
drawing conclusions about the nature of self-knowledge from examples featuring the use 
of psychological vocabulary in everyday discourse.  For everyday discourse often 
features questions ostensibly about your mental states whose principal aim is not really to 
elicit a report about your mental states.  When a stranger asks me 'Do you know how to 
get to Washington Square Park?', I must attend, in answering her, to precisely the same 
outward phenomena I would attend to in answering 'How do you get to Washington 
Square Park?' But that is because the latter question is the one she really wanted 
answered.  If she instead was simply curious about the state of my geographical 
knowledge, I could tell her that I know how to get to Washington Square Park without 
bothering to think about how to get there.  In Evans' example, it is natural to interpret the 
friend as prompting Evans to contribute to a discussion about whether there will be a 
third world war, rather than as soliciting a yes or no answer about whether Evans has an 
opinion.  For this reason, claims about the appropriate procedure for responding to the 
friend’s question, however plausible, are a poor guide to the procedure for knowing one’s 
beliefs.   18
!  Of course, there are psychological limits on our capacity to keep track of the evidence on which our 16
beliefs are based.  This point is made forcefully by Harman (1986), although I think he overstates the 
severity of these limits.
!  (Evans, 1982, p.  225).17
!  For a dissenting view, see (Gordon, 2007).  Although Gordon draws inspiration from Evans, his theory 18
has some important differences from those discussed here.
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3.  Transparency and Reliability 
Despite its attractions, Transparency can seem intuitively puzzling.  According to our 
ordinary understanding of what a reason for belief is, p can be a good reason or basis on 
which to believe that q only if p is strong evidence for the truth of q.  This ordinary 
understanding seems incompatible with Transparency.  Setting aside special cases where 
you are a hyper-expert about whether p, the fact that p is not itself very strong evidence 
that you believe that p. 
Below I will present a series of problems for Transparency, which I take to clarify and 
reinforce this intuitive puzzle.  But first I want to set aside a related worry to which the 
Transparency theorist may have an effective reply.  Although the worry is loosely 
inspired by ones that have appeared in the literature,   I will present it in my own way, 19
with the aim of highlighting what I see as the broader theoretical issues at stake. 
Although the worry itself will be set aside, we will take away some lessons about one 
kind of theory about inferential justification which serves as a natural compliment to 
Transparency, and which we will have a chance to discuss in greater depth in Section 5. 
We can start with some common intuitions about Gettier-style examples like the 
following: 
Broken Barometer:  The barometer is broken, but you believe, on the 
basis of extensive supporting evidence, that it is working properly.  You 
can see that the barometer reads ‘low’, and you believe on this basis that 
the barometric pressure is low. 
Cases like Broken Barometer tend to elicit two intuitive reactions.  The first is that, since 
you have every reason to believe that the barometer is working, it is rational or 
reasonable for you to believe that that the pressure is low.  Indeed, when you see that the 
barometer reads ‘low’, it would be irrational for you not to believe that the pressure is 
low.  The second reaction is that, since the barometer is broken, you are in no position to 
know that the pressure is low based on what you have seen—even if what you believe 
happens to be true. 
I am taking Transparency to be the claim that p is a good reason for one to believe that 
one believes p, in the sense that one can be justified in believing that one believes p based 
on p.  The worry I want to set aside, which concerns the Transparency theorist’s ability to 
explain our knowledge of our beliefs, might be stated like this.  Since our self-ascriptions 
of belief not only are justified but furthermore amount to knowledge, any theorist with a 
story about how our self-ascriptions are justified is committed to a corresponding story 
about how they amount to knowledge.  The Transparency theorist, in particular, is 
committed to the claim that one can know that one believes p, and not merely be justified 
!  See, e.g., (Byrne, 2005 Sec.  7.2).  A related objection is raised by Silins (2012, pp. 304-305).19
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in believing that one does, on the basis that p.  And the lesson of cases like Broken 
Barometer, so the objection goes, is that one can know that q on the basis that p only if p 
is an objectively reliable indicator that q.  This is incompatible with the Transparency 
theorist’s proposal, however, because in typical cases p is not an objectively reliable 
indicator that one believes p. 
This objection makes a few potentially controversial moves, but I think there is one in 
particular that the Transparency theorist is well-positioned to respond to.  Let's say that p 
is an adequate ground for you to know that q just in case you are in a position to know 
that q on the basis that p.  A crucial step in the objection is left-to-right direction of a first 
pass view about inferential knowledge that says that, for all values of p and q, 
Evidential Reliabilism:  p is an adequate ground for you to know that q 
iff p is an objectively reliable indicator that q. 
The Evidential Reliabilist owes us a story about what it means for p to be an objectively 
reliable indicator that q.  But to a first approximation, it has something to do with the 
counterfactual sensitivity or statistical correlation between the p-facts and the q-facts. 
The guiding idea is that in order for one to have knowledge grounded in evidence, there 
must be some sort of causal or statistical connection between the evidence and what that 
evidence enables one to know.  For example, in the case of the Broken Barometer the 
Evidential Reliabilist says that one cannot know that the pressure is low on the grounds 
that the barometer reads ‘low’ because the fact that it reads ‘low’ does not reliably 
indicate that the pressure is low—since the barometer is broken, its readings are not 
connected to the facts in the way that is needed to confer knowledge. 
In reply to the Evidential Reliabilist’s objection, the Transparency theorist cannot 
plausibly maintain that in general the fact that p is an objectively reliable indicator that 
one believes that p.  Unless you are a weather hyper-expert, the fact that it will rain is not 
an objectively reliable indicator that you believe that it will rain.  So the Transparency 
theorist must reject Evidential Reliabilism.  Nonetheless, the Transparency theorist has 
available a different account of the Broken Barometer case, which replaces Evidential 
Reliabilism with the claim that for all values of p and q, 
Inferential Reliabilism:  p is an adequate ground for you to know that q 
iff inferring from p that q is a reliable belief-forming process.   20
In most cases, the only realistic way for the process of inferring from p that q to be 
reliable is for the facts about p to be appropriately connected with the facts about q.  But 
in the kinds of cases the Transparency theorist is concerned with, the process of inferring 
from p that one believes p can achieve its reliability in an unusual way.  Since one must 
!  See, e.g., (Alston, 1986 and 1988) and (Comesaña, 2010) for more refined versions of Inferential 20
Reliabilism, but note that Comesaña identifies his view as a kind of evidentialism.
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believe that p in order to infer from p that q, the process of inferring from p that one 
believes p will be reliable, regardless of the connection between the p-facts and the facts 
about one’s beliefs.   21
Not only does this move help to forestall an objection to Transparency, it furthermore 
may be seen as providing an additional line of motivation in its favor.  For consider the 
right-to-left direction of Inferential Reliabilism, which says that you can know that q on 
the basis that p if inferring from p that q is a reliable belief-forming process.  Assuming 
that knowledge requires justification, this means that you can be justified in believing that 
q on the basis of p if inferring from p that q is reliable, as it is in the case of inferring 
from p that you believe that p. 
We should be clear that Inferential Reliabilism is only a first pass view, and that those 
who are attracted to what it says in broad outline will wish to refine it in various ways 
(e.g., by adding a ‘no defeaters’ clause).  Still, I think it is plausible that to the extent that 
the Inferential Reliabilist wishes to distinguish his view from Evidential Reliabilism, we 
should expect further refinements to leave the implication of Transparency intact.  This is 
because a transparent inference is a paradigmatic case where a transition from the belief 
that p to the belief that q is reliable even in the absence of a corresponding reliable 
connection between the p-facts and the q-facts.  So to the extent that one is attracted to 
Inferential Reliabilism, one should take this attraction to provide an additional line of 
motivation for Transparency.  (The flip side, of course, is that to the extent that 
Transparency suffers from problems, so does Inferential Reliabilism—a point we will 
return to in Section 5.) 
4.  Transparency and Reasons for Belief 
We have just considered and set aside a worry concerning the suitability of p as grounds 
for knowing that one believes that p.  Put roughly, the worry was that for p to be grounds 
for knowing q, there must be an objective connection of an appropriate kind between the 
facts about p and the facts about q, and that the facts about the world and the facts about 
your beliefs are not so connected.  It is time to start pressing my main line of objection to 
Transparency, which concerns more directly the suitability of p as a reason on which one 
can justifiably believe that q.  Again put roughly, the worry is that for p to be a good 
reason to believe that q, there must be an appropriate kind of subjective connection 
between p and q, such that you might reasonably take the fact that p to show that q is 
true.  This is a problem for Transparency because prima facie it does not seem true that 
you might reasonably take the fact that it will rain to show that you believe it will rain. 
In rough outline, this source of discomfort with Transparency is a common one.  But we 
need to be careful in spelling it out in detail.  Although others have rightly noted a 
problem here, I do not think they have developed the problem in its strongest form. 
!  Byrne (2005) makes a similar point in his response to what he calls “the puzzle of transparency.”21
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Before attempting to do so, I will first consider three existing attempts, which I call the 
independence objection, the nonstandard form objection, and the reflective 
endorsement objection. 
Start with the independence objection raised by Richard Moran.  Although Moran accepts 
a view closely related to Transparency, he cautions that 
the claim of Transparency is something of a paradox:  how can a question 
referring to a matter of empirical psychological fact about a particular 
person be legitimately answered without appeal to evidence about that 
person, but rather by appeal to a quite independent body of evidence?   22
While I am sympathetic to Moran’s felt sense of paradox, I think what he says is 
inadequate as it stands.  We are often justified in inferring a conclusion from a body 
evidence that concerns an independent subject matter, as when we infer from a premise 
about the reading of a barometer to a conclusion about the barometric pressure in the 
atmosphere.  Of course, it might be that in this case the evidence from which one draws 
the inference is not really independent of the conclusion in the way Moran has in mind. 
But characterizing the relevant kind of independence is not a trivial task.  It might be 
suggested that the facts about the world are not statistically or counterfactually associated 
with the facts about one’s beliefs in the way that the facts about a reliable barometer’s 
readings are associated with the barometric pressure.  But as we already have seen in 
Section 3, the Transparency theorist has an effective reply to anyone who would require 
the premise of an inference to be an objectively reliable indicator of its conclusion. 
Another suggestion is that in the case of the barometer you have additional ‘connecting 
evidence’ that supports that the facts about the barometer’s readings are relevant to the 
barometric pressure, and that this evidence is lacking for an inference from p to ‘I believe 
that p’.  The problem with this suggestion is that it is implausible that one must always 
have such connecting evidence.  Such a general requirement leads to an implausible 
skepticism about inferential justification.  Take the total stock of evidence that you know 
by non-inferential means.  If your beliefs about other a posteriori subject matters are 
justified, they must be justified by inference from this evidence.  But by stipulation, you 
have no additional connecting evidence available.  Note that this skeptical problem 
requires no controversial assumptions about what can be known non-inferentially.  Under 
a traditional Cartesian model of perception, this will include only facts about your own 
mental states.  And the resulting skepticism will extend to all of your beliefs about the 
external world.  But even if we extend the domain of non-inferential knowledge beyond 
what the Cartesian allows—to include ordinary perceptual knowledge, for example—we 
still are left with an unacceptable skepticism about everything that you do not know 
directly by perception. 
!  (Moran, 2003, pg. 413), as quoted in (Byrne, 2005)22
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Turn now to the nonstandard form objection raised by Andre Gallois.    Gallois’ worry is 23
that an inference from the premise p to the conclusion that one believes that p does not fit 
any standard form of good inference.  It is not inductively valid, nor is it inductively 
strong, nor is it an instance of inference to the best explanation.  But I think this objection 
to Transparency is also inadequate.  For it relies on the assumption that a justified 
inference must fit one of these standard forms.  And this assumption is rejected by many 
theorists who might otherwise be sympathetic to our rough line of objection to 
Transparency.  Consider for example an ‘anti-reductionist’ view about testimony, which 
says that you can be justified in believing that q based on a source’s testimony that q even 
though you have neither inductive nor deductive reasons to believe that if the source says 
that q then q is true.    Anti-reductionists typically deny that justified inferences must 24
always fit standard deductive, inductive, or abductive forms.  But perhaps the anti-
reductionist could still admit of some further sense in which you must take the source’s 
saying that q to show that q is true.  A similar point could be made about theories of 
perceptual justification that hold that one can justifiably infer conclusions about the 
external world from premises about one’s experiences, even when the inferences do not 
fit the standard forms.   25
Finally, consider the reflective endorsement objection raised by Matthew Boyle.  Calling 
an inference from p to ‘I believe that p’ not only “deeply unreasonable” but “mad,” Boyle 
explains that 
To believe that I believe P is to hold it true that I believe P.  Being a 
reflective person, I can ask myself what grounds I have for holding this 
true.  The answer ‘P’ is obviously irrelevant.  I am asking what shows that 
the proposition I believe P is true, and a modicum of rational insight will 
inform me that, even if it is true that P, this by itself has no tendency to 
show that I believe it. … A (person-level) inference is not a mere transition 
from a stimulus to a response; it is a transition of whose terms I am 
cognizant, and whose occurrence depends on my—in the normal case: 
persistently—taking there to be an intelligible relation between these 
terms.  This is what makes it possible for an inference to leave me with a 
!  (Gallois, 1996, pg. 47)23
!  See (Adler, 2006) for a helpful survey on the epistemology of testimony.  I discuss one kind of anti-24
reductionism about testimony in (Barnett, MS b).
!  Note that such theories do not need to hold that we actually do regularly engage in such inferences.  With 25
this caveat in mind, I think most theories of perception that I elsewhere call ‘Cartesian’ (Barnett, MS ???), 
would qualify.  Notable exceptions include Vogel (1990), who thinks that we can infer conclusions about 
the external world from premises about our own perceptual experiences via inference to the best 
explanation, and Descartes himself, who thinks that there is a deductive argument to such conclusions that 
appeals to supplementary premises that can be known by intuition.
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sustained belief:  I can reflect on why I draw a certain conclusion, and 
when I do, I can see (what looks to me to be) a reason for it.   26
Boyle’s criticism of Transparency appeals to two key ideas.  The first, which I accept, is 
that you are justified in inferring from p that q only if you take the fact that p to show that 
q is true.  The second is a kind of reflective endorsement requirement on justified 
inference, which holds that you are justified in inferring from p that q only if on 
reflection you would judge that p is a good reason to believe that q.    As I understand 27
Boyle, his strategy is to appeal to the second of these ideas in support of the first.  I have 
my doubts about whether the second idea really does support the first, and I argue 
elsewhere that the two ideas are moreover incompatible with each other.    We do not 28
need to wade into this issue here, however.  For there is a more direct way of seeing that 
no plausible reflective endorsement requirement poses a serious problem for 
Transparency.  Note that any such requirement must help itself to a fair bit of idealization. 
Consider, for example, the student who is led by some hair-brained epistemological 
theory to believe that she has no good reason to believe that she has hands.  On pain of 
counting the belief that she has hands unjustified, the reflective endorsement requirement 
must say that what matters is not the student’s actual reflective endorsement, but instead 
her reflective endorsement under an idealization where she does not believe the hair-
brained epistemological theory.  With this in mind, it should be clear that the reflective 
endorsement requirement poses no special problem for Transparency.  For the 
Transparency theorist thinks that p is a good reason to believe that one believes p, and 
rejects that this requires p to amount to evidence that one believes p.  So the 
Transparency theorist can say that under idealized circumstances, an agent will be in a 
position to reflectively endorse p as a good reason to believe that she believes p, for such 
an agent will not mistakenly believe that this requires p to be evidence that she believes 
that p.  (Of course, I agree with Boyle that these claims from the Transparency theorist 
should be resisted, but the point at issue here is whether the reflective endorsement 
requirement gives us any additional ammunition for doing so.) 
So although I am sympathetic to the rough and intuitive idea behind these objections to 
Transparency, I think we need to exercise greater caution in developing the objection in 
greater detail.    Below, I will outline three closely related objections to transparency that 29
all grow out of the guiding idea that you cannot justifiably believe a conclusion based on 
a premise unless you can justifiably take the premise to show that the conclusion is true. 
!  (Boyle, 2011, pp. 230-231)26
!  Indeed, Boyle wants to make the stronger claim that one cannot hold a belief at all, much less a justified 27
one, without meeting this requirement.  But we need not saddle the objection to Transparency with this 
stronger and more controversial claim.
!  See (Barnett, MS ???) for further discussion.28
!  Other critics have stressed a more specific objection to Transparency stemming from a principle I call 29
‘Inheritance’, which I discuss below in Section 4.2.
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After going through the objections individually, we will return in Section 5 to the bigger 
picture. 
4.1 Hypothetical Reasoning and Indicative Conditionals 
Our first problem for Transparency concerns its incompatibility with an appealing claim 
about the relationship between hypothetical and categorical reasoning, which says that 
inferential support is preserved under hypothetical supposition.  Let me explain. 
Consider a typical case of categorical reasoning:  You see that the barometer reads ‘low’, 
and you infer that the pressure is low.  In making this inference, you in some sense take it 
to be a fact that the barometer reads ‘low’, and you furthermore take this fact about the 
barometer's reading to show that the barometric pressure is low.  Because inferring from 
p that q requires taking it to be a fact that p, the Transparency theorist can plausibly claim 
that you cannot infer from p that q unless you believe that p.  This allows the 
Transparency theorist to cite the reliability of inferring from p that you believe that p in 
an effort to explain how your self-ascriptions of belief might amount to knowledge. 
Not all reasoning involves making inferences in this sense, however.  For even if you do 
not believe that the barometer reads ‘low’, you still can consider the possibility that it 
reads ‘low’ as a hypothetical supposition.  If it is reasonable or rational for you to take the 
fact that the barometer reads ‘low’ to show that the pressure is low, then it should be 
rational for you to accept that the pressure is low under this hypothetical supposition. 
More generally, it is appealing to say that 
Hypothetical Reasoning:  If p is a good reason for you to believe that q, 
then you are in a position to accept   that q under the hypothetical 30
supposition that p.   31
If we accept Transparency, however, we must reject Hypothetical Reasoning.  For if you 
consider the possibility that the number of stars is even as a hypothetical supposition, you 
could not accept under this supposition that you believe that the number of stars is even. 
While I take this claim to be prima facie plausible, it is worth reinforcing in greater 
detail.  We can do so by considering a few important applications of hypothetical 
reasoning. 
Our first application is the Ramsey Test for the assertability of indicative conditionals 
such as ‘If the barometer reads ‘low’, then the pressure is low’.  According to a famous 
suggestion from Frank Ramsey, 
!  You are in a position to accept something if it rationally permissible for you to do so.  Being in a position 30
to accept something does not require the psychological ability to do it.
!  See (Cohen, 2010) for a recent defense of Hypothetical Reasoning, although Cohen’s main concerns are 31
quite different from those at issue here.
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If two people are arguing ‘if p will q?’ and both are in doubt as to p, they 
are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on 
that basis about q.   32
One natural way of developing Ramsey’s suggestion, which replaces his heuristic talk 
about two people arguing with talk about a single person reasoning, says that 
Ramsey Test:  ‘If p, then q’ is assertable for you iff you can accept that q 
under the hypothetical supposition that p. 
We have on the table three claims.  The first claim is Transparency, which concerns the 
justification of self-ascriptions of belief.  The second claim is Hypothetical Reasoning, 
which concerns the relationship between hypothetical and categorical reasoning.  And the 
third claim is the Ramsey Test, which concerns the relationship between hypothetical 
reasoning and the assertability of indicative conditionals.  Put these three claims together, 
and we are left with absurd results.  For if we accept both Transparency and Hypothetical 
Reasoning, then it follows from the right-to-left direction of the Ramsey Test that you can 
assert the conditional ‘If p, then I believe that p’ for any proposition p.  But that is absurd. 
For instance, it would mean that the following conditionals are assertable:  ‘If there is life 
on other planets, then I believe that there is life on other planets’, ‘If the number of stars 
is even, then I believe that the number stars is even’.  Accepting every conditional of this 
form would be tantamount to accepting that you are an omniscient god.  Adapting a 
slogan from David Chalmers and Alan Hájek, we can say that Ramsey + Transparency = 
God.   33
It would be a mistake to see this as a problem for the Ramsey Test, rather than for 
Transparency.  For other familiar applications of hypothetical reasoning will lead us to 
equally absurd results. 
Consider Reasoning by Cases.  You know that either there is life on other planets or there 
isn't.  If you can accept that you believe there is life on other planets under the 
supposition that there is, then Reasoning by Cases will allow you to conclude ‘Either I 
believe that there is life on other planets, or there is not life on other planets.’ In short, 
Reasoning by Cases + Transparency = God. 
The same goes for reductio ad absurdum.  Suppose for reductio <p, but I do not believe 
that p>.  Under this supposition, Transparency will allow you to accept that you believe 
that p and you don’t believe that p.  Since this is a contradiction, you can conclude that it 
is not the case that p and you do not believe that p.  For example, you can conclude that it 
!  (Ramsey, 1931)32
!  Invoking Moore’s Paradox, Chalmers and Hájek’s (2006) slogan is that Ramsey + Moore = God.33
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is not the case that there is life on other planets and you do not believe that there is. 
Reductio + Transparency = God.   34
The takeaway lesson is that if we accept Transparency, we must reject Hypothetical 
Reasoning.  This is a significant cost,   although it is a cost that at least some 35
Transparency theorists may be prepared to accept.   36
4.2 Continuity and Degrees of Confidence 
My second objection to Transparency concerns its implications for self-ascriptions of 
belief under conditions of first-order uncertainty—such as in a case where your 
meteorological evidence leaves it open whether it will rain, and you cannot justifiably 
hold a belief either way.  Before stating the objection directly, I first wish to consider a 
pair of closely affiliated objections that have made appearances in the recent literature. 
The first of these objections, as discussed by Michael Martin, Sydney Shoemaker, and 
Nico Silins, appeals to the idea that when you believe that q on the basis that p, your 
belief that q will inherit any epistemic defects possessed by your belief that p.    For 37
example, if you believe that the tennis match will be cancelled on the basis that it will 
rain, then your belief that the match will be cancelled will be unjustified if your belief 
that it will rain is unjustified.  Generalizing from cases like this might lead us to accept 
the more general principle that 
Inheritance:  If you believe that q on the basis that p, then your belief that 
q is unjustified if your belief that p is unjustified. 
To see why Inheritance is in tension with Transparency, bear in mind that if Transparency 
is to help us explain the justification of ordinary self-ascriptions of belief, then ordinarily 
we must believe that we believe that p on the basis of p itself.  According to Inheritance, 
this means that in ordinary cases your belief that you believe that p will be justified only 
if your belief that p is justified.  Yet it seems that when you self-ascribe beliefs in the 
!  The incompatibility of Transparency with reductio ad absurdum reasoning has been noted independently 34
by Valaris (2011).
!  Hypothetical Reasoning has been questioned recently by Weatherson (2012), but for reasons far removed 35
from those at issue here.  Weatherson claims that when reasoning non-deductively we can arrive at absurd 
conclusions using only hypothetical reasoning and other plausible rules of reasoning.  But as Dogramaci 
(2010) argues, the reasoning that allows us to reach the absurd conclusion also involves the use of a 
Universal Introduction rule that is highly suspect in the context of non-deductive reasoning.
!  See especially Byrne’s (2005, Sec.  7.2) comparison with the rule of necessitation in modal logic, which 36
allows you to move from the lemma that p to the conclusion that necessarily p, so long as the lemma that p 
was derived in an appropriate fashion.  I think it is independently implausible that the rule of necessitation 
is a good rule of reasoning in the sense that is of interest here.  (Of course, if you know that you have 
derived that p in an appropriate fashion, then this fact may be a good reason on whose basis to believe that 
necessarily p.)
!  See (Martin, 1998), (Shoemaker, 2009) and (Silins, 2012, pp. 304-305).37
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usual way, your self-ascription can be justified even if the self-ascribed belief is 
unjustified. 
Although I am sympathetic to this objection in spirit, I think that as it stands it faces two 
serious problems.  The first is that insofar as Inheritance is supported solely by induction 
from uncontroversial cases, it is open to the Transparency theorist to reject Inheritance in 
favor of an alternative principle that gets the uncontroversial cases right without causing 
problems for Transparency.    The second problem is that the Transparency theorist might 38
take issue with the claim that self-ascriptions of unjustified beliefs are themselves 
unambiguously justified, and claim instead that they are merely locally justified.  Let me 
explain. 
Suppose you know that the tennis match will be cancelled if it rains.  If you form an 
unjustified belief that it will rain, there seems to be an important sense in which, given 
the fact that you believe this, you ought to believe that the tennis match will be cancelled. 
This is what I have in mind when I say that a belief is locally justified—rough speaking, 
the belief fits in with its immediate doxastic surroundings.  Even so, intuitively there is a 
further global sense in which the belief that the tennis match will be cancelled is 
unjustified.  What it takes for a belief to be globally unjustified is not obvious, but one 
initial gloss is that a globally unjustified belief is one that would be locally unjustified if 
the attitudes in its immediate doxastic surroundings were justified.  The belief that the 
tennis match will be cancelled qualifies as globally unjustified in this sense because if 
you were to doubt as you should that it will rain, then the belief that the tennis match will 
be cancelled would be locally unjustified.  If this initial gloss is on the right track, then 
the Transparency theorist could reply to the objection from Inheritance by claiming that, 
like your belief that the tennis match will be cancelled when you unjustifiably believe 
that it will rain, the self-ascriptions of an unjustified belief is locally justified but globally 
unjustified.  For if you unjustifiably believe that it will rain, then there surely is a sense in 
which, given that attitude, you ought to believe that you believe that it will rain.  But it 
also is true that if you withheld belief as you should from the proposition that it will rain, 
then you would not be even locally justified in believing that you believe that it will rain. 
Although I have my doubts about the gloss on global justification on which this reply 
depends, rather than contesting it I think we are better off pressing our objection to 
Transparency in a way that avoids cases of self-ascribing attitudes that are themselves 
unjustified. 
Turn now to the second affiliated objection, which concerns cases where in response to 
inconclusive meteorological evidence you justifiably remain uncertain whether it will 
rain.  In such cases it seems clear that you can both know and justifiably believe that you 
are uncertain whether it will rain.  But the objection, advanced recently by Brie Gertler, is 
that the Transparency theorist seems unable to explain how your belief that you are 
!  Byrne (2005) develops a plausible reply of this sort to a closely related objection that concerns 38
knowledge rather than justification.
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uncertain is justified.    More generally, it seems that the Transparency theorist is able to 39
explain only how you are justified in self-ascribing beliefs, and not how you are justified 
in self-ascribing other doxastic attitudes like uncertainty. 
Although I am sympathetic to this objection as well, it is less forceful than we might wish 
because so long as our objection appeals solely to Transparency’s lack of explanatory 
power, it remains open for the Transparency theorist to expand his theory to handle a 
wider range of cases.  For example, it might be possible for the Transparency theorist to 
claim that the proposition that it is unclear whether p is a good reason to believe that you 
are uncertain whether p.  It might even be possible simply to deny that the explanation of 
our self-ascriptions of doxastic attitudes is uniform, and claim that the justification of our 
self-ascriptions of uncertainty is different in kind from that of our self-ascriptions of 
belief. 
Although I am skeptical that these replies on the Transparency theorist’s behalf ultimately 
succeed, there is a more decisive problem stemming from examples involving first-order 
uncertainty.  For the Transparency theorist seems not only unable to say the right thing 
about such examples, but moreover committed to saying the wrong thing.  The difficulty 
stems from the rough thought that if p itself is a good reason for you to believe that q, 
then the strength of your epistemic position with respect to q should vary continuously 
with that of your position with respect to p.  Roughly speaking, what this means is that 
the stronger your reasons are for believing that p, the stronger your reasons will be for 
believing that q.  For example, if the fact that it will rain is itself a good reason for you to 
believe that the tennis match will be cancelled, then the stronger your reasons are for 
believing that it will rain, the stronger your reasons will be for believing that the match 
will be cancelled.  Again put roughly, the claim is that 
Continuity:  If p is a good reason for you to believe that q, then the 
stronger your reasons are for believing that p, the stronger your reasons 
are for believing that q. 
While I take the intuitive motivation for Continuity to be apparent, there are some 
important delicacies involved in spelling it out in greater detail.    For our purposes, we 40
can restrict our attention to a particular consequence of Continuity:  If p is a good reason 
for you to believe that q, then you can be at least roughly as confident that q as you are 
that p. 
Let’s first see how we get from the general claim of Continuity to this particular 
consequence.  First, even if p is a good reason for you to believe that q, you can always 
have other reasons for believing that q.  So your reasons for believing that q can be 
stronger than your reasons for believing that p.  The second point of clarification 
!  (Gertler, 2011)39
!  For discussion, see (Kotzen, forthcoming), (Pryor, 2004, pp. 350-351), and (White, 2006, p.  532).40
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concerns the sense in which your reasons for believing that p can come in varying 
degrees of strength.  While I think this notion should be understood in probabilistic terms, 
for our purposes here we can be quite modest in our commitments.  The crucial point for 
our purposes is that if your reasons for believing that q are at least as strong as your 
reasons for believing that p, then you are in a position to be at least as confident that q as 
you are that p.    For example, if you have strong enough evidence to be pretty sure that it 41
will rain, then, assuming that this is a good reason for you to believe that the tennis match 
will be cancelled, Continuity will say that you are in a position to at least be pretty sure 
that the tennis match will be cancelled.  Finally, since believing that q does not entail 
subjective certainty that q, it is plausible that p can be a good reason to believe that q 
even if certainty that p leaves room for a sliver of doubt as to the truth of q. 
Correspondingly, in cases where you are not certain that p it may be appropriate for you 
to be slightly less confident that q than you are that p. 
The Transparency theorist is in no position to accept this consequence of Continuity.  For 
the epistemic relationship between p and the proposition that you believe that p is not 
continuous in the way it requires.  For example,if you have strong enough evidence to be 
pretty sure that it will rain, this does not mean that you can at least be pretty sure that you 
believe that it will rain.  For if you are only pretty sure that it will rain, then presumably 
you are in a position to know that you do not believe that it will rain. 
4.3 Alternative Elimination 
The final problem for Transparency concerns its incompatibility with the claim that: 
Alternative Elimination:  p is a good reason for you to believe that q 
only if you have prior justification to reject the alternative possibility that 
p but not-q. 
We can take rejecting (or eliminating) a possibility to consist in believing that it does not 
obtain.  And we can take prior justification to mean justification that does not depend on 
your believing that p or having justification to believe that p.  If so, it should be clear that 
the Transparency theorist must reject Alternative Elimination.  For in cases where you do 
not believe that p and lack justification to believe that p, you often are in no position to 
reject the possibility that both p and you don't believe that p.  For example, you are in no 
!  A potential worry here, emphasized to me by an anonymous referee, is that one cannot always be as 41
confident of the remote consequences of one’s evidence as one is of the evidence itself because of higher-
order doubts about one’s own reliability at determining what the consequences of one’s evidence are.  But I 
think we can set this worry aside, since Continuity speaks only to cases where p is a good reason to believe 
that q in the (stipulative) sense that you are in a position to justifiably believe that q on the basis that p. 
Continuity is therefore silent about putative cases where p entails q, but where you are not in a position to 
justifiably believe that q on the basis that p due to higher-order doubts about your own ability to determine 
whether p entails q.
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position to reject the possibility that the number of stars is even and you don't believe that 
it is even.   42
In rejecting Alternative Elimination, the Transparency theorist may appear to be in good 
company.  A number of theorists, including some externalists about inferential 
justification, have rightly noted that they are committed to rejecting it.  Still, I think a 
closer look at the kinds of moves available to such theorists cuts against this initial 
appearance of agreement.  When externalists about justification contest Alternative 
Elimination, their concern is with its implications for cases like the following: 
Mysterious Barometer:  The barometer is working properly, but because 
you lack evidence one way or the other, you are uncertain whether it is 
working.  You can see that the barometer reads ‘low’, and you believe on 
this basis that the barometric pressure is low. 
This is the sort of case over which internalists and externalists about justification tend to 
disagree.  The orthodox internalist verdict says that the fact that the barometer reads 'low' 
is not a good reason for you to believe that the barometric pressure is low.  The orthodox 
externalist verdict says that it is a good reason for you to believe that the pressure is low, 
at least in the absence of various undermining conditions. 
If we accept Alternative Elimination, then we must reject the orthodox externalist verdict. 
To see why, consider your epistemic situation prior to learning that the barometer reads 
'low'.  Since you are uncertain whether the barometer is working, you are in no position 
to reject the possibility that the barometer's reading, whatever it is, is inaccurate.  In the 
absence of independent evidence that the pressure is low, therefore, you will be in no 
position to reject the more specific possibility that 
Inaccurate ‘Low’:  The barometer reads ‘low’, but the pressure isn’t low. 
This is why a theorist must reject Alternative Elimination if she wishes to say that the 
barometer's reading 'low' is a good reason for you to believe that the barometric pressure 
is low.  In rejecting Alternative Elimination, such a theorist must choose between two 
unappealing options. 
The first option involves denying the general principle that justification is closed under 
deductive implication.  A first pass version of this general principle says that you are 
justified in believing a proposition only if you have justification to believe all of its 
logical consequences.  This first pass version of the principle may need to be refined in 
!  It is worth noting that Alternative Elimination plausibly follows from Hypothetical Reasoning using the 42
reductio ad absurdum rule.  Here I wish to offer a motivation for Alternative Elimination that is 
independent of Hypothetical Reasoning.
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various ways,   but for our purposes we need only consider the restricted claim that for 43
all values of p and q, 
Closure:  You are justified in believing that q only if you have 
justification to reject that p and not-q. 
The theorist who seeks to reject Alternative Elimination by rejecting Closure must say 
something funny about your epistemic situation after you learn that the barometer reads 
'low'.  For this theorist says that you are justified in believing that the pressure is low, and 
yet unjustified in rejecting the possibility that the barometer reads ‘low' inaccurately.  44
Since it is obvious that the barometer cannot read 'low’ inaccurately if the pressure really 
is low, it seems incoherent and unjustifiable for you to believe that the pressure is low 
even while remaining open to the possibility that the barometer reads ‘low’ inaccurately. 
So the theorist who denies Closure in ordinary situations like this seems committed to 
rampant epistemic quagmires, in which you cannot justifiably remain open to the 
possibility that the barometer reads ‘low’ inaccurately even though you cannot justifiably 
reject that possibility either.    This is a funny thing for a theorist to say.  Nevertheless, 45
saying this funny thing may be a cost some externalists are willing to pay.    Let's press 46
on. 
The second option involves denying that reasons for belief must help one to discriminate 
between what is true and what is false.  In rough and impressionistic terms, the view that 
reasons must be discriminating in this way says that a reason to believe a proposition 
must take the form of evidence or considerations pointing in favor of its truth, while a 
reason to reject that proposition must take the form of evidence or considerations 
pointing the other way.  If we accept this rough idea, then it seems that we also should 
accept the more specific claim that p can give us no reason at all to favor the possibility 
that p and q over the possibility that p and not-q—for regardless of which of these two 
possibilities obtain it will be the case that p.  And if we accept the claim that p can give us 
no reason at all to favor the possibility that p and q over the possibility that p and not-q, 
then then we also should accept the more modest claim that p cannot give us sufficient 
!  I have in mind worries related to the failure of “logical omniscience,” which concern primarily the 43
distant and unobvious consequences of propositions that we justifiably believe.  For recent discussion, see 
(Christensen, 2004) and (Schechter, forthcoming).
!  Even if a Closure-denying theorist says that you are not justified in rejecting that the barometer reads 44
‘low’ inaccurately, she still might grant that you are justified in rejecting that the pressure is not low.  For 
comparison, a Closure-denier might say that you are unjustified in rejecting that you are a brain in a vat 
with no hands, but still allow that you are justified in rejecting that you have no hands.
!  See the discussion of the Existence thesis in (Barnett, MS a).45
!  For a recent survey of attempts to reject Closure, see (Avnur, 2012).  Although Avnur is not an 46
externalist, he rejects Closure in special cases involving the rejection of extreme skeptical possibilities, 
allowing that in such cases you cannot justifiably remain open to possibilities that you also cannot 
justifiably reject.
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reason to altogether reject the possibility that p and not-q.  That is, for all values of p and 
q such that p and not-q is possible,   47
Discrimination:  p is not a good reason to reject that p and not-q. 
The theorist who seeks to reject Alternative Elimination by rejecting Discrimination says 
something funny about the epistemic impact of learning that the barometer reads 'low'. 
For this theorist says that when you look over to see that the barometer reads 'low', you 
thereby become justified in rejecting the possibility that it reads 'low' inaccurately.  Since 
it is obvious that the barometer can read 'low' inaccurately only if it reads 'low', this too is 
a funny thing to say.  For again, reading ‘low’ is exactly what you should expect from a 
barometer that reads ‘low’ inaccurately.  So it is difficult to see how you could be 
justified in rejecting the possibility that the reads 'low' inaccurately on the basis that it 
reads 'low'.   48
We are now in a position to see the Transparency theorist's dilemma with respect to 
rejecting Alternative Elimination.  For suppose that, in the face of limited or conflicting 
meteorological evidence, you are uncertain whether it will rain.  Since you do not believe 
that it will rain, you are in no position to reject the possibility that 
Unexpected Rain:  It will rain, but you don't believe that it will rain. 
Since you lack justification to reject the possibility that it will rain unexpectedly, it 
follows from Alternative Elimination that the fact that it will rain is not a good reason for 
you to believe that you believe it will rain.  This does not mean that if you later come to 
believe that it will rain, you will be unable to justifiably self-ascribe the belief that it will 
rain.  But it does mean that you will be unable to do so on the basis that it will rain.  For 
this reason, the Transparency theorist must reject Alternative Elimination.  And this is 
hard to do. 
In contrast to the externalist about the Mysterious Barometer, the Transparency theorist 
cannot plausibly take the option that involves rejecting Closure.  When the externalist 
denies Closure, the point is to make room for your being justified in believing that the 
pressure is low, even though you are not justified in rejecting the possibility that the 
barometer reads 'low' inaccurately.  In contrast, it is not plausible that in ordinary cases of 
self-ascribing beliefs, you are justified in believing that you believe that it will rain and 
!  The requirement that p and not-q be possible is arguably necessary because it is arguable that p is a good 47
reason to reject the proposition that p and not-p, as well as other propositions where the value of q is some 
other proposition incompatible with p.  There is some room for disagreement over how best to understand 
the relevant notion of possibility.  I am undecided between an understanding where the possibilities include 
only those things consistent with your evidence and one where they include everything that cannot be ruled 
out a priori.  I do not think we need to decide the issue here.  I thank an anonymous referee for discussion 
of this point.
!  My understanding of this issue is indebted to White (2006), and to numerous discussions with Jim Pryor.48
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yet not justified in believing that it will not rain unexpectedly.  So whatever we think 
about the plausibility of an externalist's rejecting Closure in order to avoid Alternative 
Elimination, a similar move is not available to the Transparency theorist. 
It therefore seems necessary for the Transparency theorist to take the option of rejecting 
Discrimination, and of claiming that the fact that it will rain is itself a good reason for 
you to reject the possibility that it will rain unexpectedly.  This move is not without its 
intuitive costs.  In order for it to rain unexpectedly, it will have to rain.  So it is difficult to 
see how you could be justified in rejecting the possibility that it will rain unexpectedly on 
the basis that it will rain. 
More generally, the suggestion that one can be justified in rejecting the possibility that p 
and not-q on the basis that p is difficult to square with a natural conception of what a 
reason for belief is, which says that a reason to believe a proposition must take the form 
of evidence or considerations pointing in favor of its truth and conversely that a reason to 
reject the same proposition must take the form of evidence or considerations pointing the 
other way.  There is much room for internal disagreement among theorists broadly 
sympathetic to this natural conception of epistemic reasons.  But if we reject 
Discrimination, it is difficult to hold on to this natural conception of a reason for belief, 
even in broad outline.  In order for it to be the case that p and not-q, it will have to be the 
case that p.  So there appears to be no room for a view which says that p itself can point 
against the possibility that p and not-q. 
4.4.  Summary 
It is time to take a step back, and consider the bigger picture.  We began with a rough and 
intuitive objection to Transparency that appeals to a broadly evidentialist conception of 
epistemic reasons.  According to the evidentialist, p can be a good reason for you to 
believe that q only if p is strong evidence for the truth of q.  Since in typical cases p is not 
strong evidence that you believe that p, this means that p cannot be a good reason for you 
to believe that p.  The more specific objections to Transparency considered in this section 
all grow out of this guiding idea. 
It might therefore be worried that the preceding objections do not provide any 
independent motivation for rejecting Transparency, aside from the rough and intuitive 
idea that we began with.  If the Transparency theorist is willing to reject the evidentialist 
conception of reasons from the outset, the worry goes, then it does no good to mount a 
series of objections that are by design closely aligned with this sort of evidentialism.  49
But I think this worry is misguided, for at least two reasons.  First, the objections can 
strengthen the case against Transparency by making its anti-evidentialist implications 
more concrete.  It is easier for the Transparency theorist to reject a theoretical claim like 
evidentialism in the abstract than it is to reject evidentialism’s most intuitively appealing 
!  I thank Alex Byrne and David Chalmers for making this point forcefully to me in conversation.49
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consequences or components.  Second, there are reasons to be interested in the 
evidentialist objection to Transparency that go beyond our interest in persuading those 
who are not already convinced that Transparency is false.  As I will now explain in 
Section 5, Transparency lies at the fault line between competing conceptions of 
inferential justification, one of which gives explanatory priority to inferential relations 
between one’s beliefs, and the other of which gives priority to evidential relations 
between the objects of those beliefs.  Even for those of us who find Transparency’s anti-
evidentialist commitments implausible in the abstract, a closer look at these commitments
—and, in particular, their close relationship to unappealing consequences of orthodox 
reliabilism—can shed some light on this broader debate. 
5.  Reasons and Reliable Inferences 
One important dimension along which theories of inferential justification can vary is the 
familiar one running between internalist theories and externalist ones like reliabilism. 
Another dimension of variation cutting across this concerns whether explanatory priority 
is given to evidential relations between facts or propositions, or to transitions between the 
mental states that represent those facts or propositions.  If we are impressed by the 
preceding problems for Transparency, then I think we should take these problems also to 
favor our assigning explanatory priority to evidential relations rather than to transitions 
between mental states. 
Recall that one motivation for Transparency stems from Inferential Reliabilism, which on 
a first pass says that p is an adequate ground for knowing that q just in case inferring 
from p that q is a reliable belief-forming process.  As we saw in Section 3, Inferential 
Reliabilism stands in contrast to Evidential Reliabilism, which, instead of appealing to 
the reliability of the transition between the belief that p and the belief q, appeals to the 
reliability of the connection between the p-facts and the q-facts.  Because the transition 
from the belief that p to the belief that you believe that p is an instance of a reliable 
process even when the fact that p is not a reliable indicator that you believe that p, these 
two views have conflicting implications for Transparency. 
Corresponding to this distinction between Inferential and Evidential Reliabilism, we 
might draw a similar distinction between two kinds of internalist theories.  While 
internalists have sought motivation for their view from a variety of quarters, one of its 
motivations comes from dissatisfaction with the verdicts that reliabilist views generate in 
cases like the Mysterious Barometer.  As we have seen, the orthodox reliabilist verdict 
says that you can be justified in believing that the pressure is low based on the 
barometer’s reading, even though you lack justification to believe that the barometer is 
reliable.  Internalists who find this intuitively unsatisfactory often voice their complaint 
in rough terms as follows:  In order for you to be justified in inferring that the pressure is 
low from the fact that the barometer reads ‘low’, there must be an appropriate kind of 
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subjective connection between p and q, such that you might reasonably take the fact that 
p to show that q is true.   50
While I think this complaint is on the right track, we must be careful in how we 
understand it.  Consider two possibilities.  On a first pass evidentialist construal, we can 
take this to mean that for all values of p and q, 
Evidential Internalism:  p is a good reason for you to believe that q iff 
you have justification to believe that p is an objectively reliable indicator 
that q. 
On a first pass inferentialist construal, we might replace the requirement that one have 
justification to believe in an appropriate relationship between the p-facts and the q-facts 
with the requirement that one have justification to believe merely that the inferential 
transition from a belief that p to a belief that q is a reliable one.  This gives us: 
Inferential Internalism:  p is a good reason for you to believe that q iff 
you have justification to believe that inferring from p that q is a reliable 
belief-forming process.   51
The difference between inferentialist and evidentialist approaches concerns how to 
explain why some inferences are justified and others are not.  The inferentialist prioritizes 
the reliability, or the subject’s awareness of the reliability, of the psychological transitions 
between beliefs, while the evidentialist prioritizes evidential support relations between 
facts or propositions, and explains the justifiedness of transitions between beliefs in terms 
of them.  The difference between these competing explanatory models is rarely noted, 
and when it is, it is sometimes taken for granted that inferential and explanatory models 
need not conflict about which inferences are justified.    It is not hard to see why.  As was 52
the case with Evidential and Inferential Reliabilism, Evidential and Inferential 
Internalism give similar verdicts about most ordinary cases.  For in ordinary cases, the 
transition from the belief that p to the the belief that q is an instance of a reliable process 
only if there is a reliable connection between the p-facts and the q-facts.  And this means 
!  See, e.g., (BonJour, 1985, Ch. 3) and (Boghossian, 1989, pp. 8-9).50
!  As with Evidential and Inferential reliabilism, Evidential and Inferential internalism must be further 51
qualified to be plausible, for example by including a ‘no defeaters’ clause.  With this qualification in place, 
I think it is plausible that Evidential Internalism, but not Inferential Internalism, has Hypothetical 
Reasoning, Continuity, and Alternative Elimination as consequences.  However, Evidential Internalism is 
arguably stronger than these three theses in ways that might bring unwanted consequences.  Although I am 
generally sympathetic to Evidential Internalism, I worry in particular about unwanted and unnecessary 
skeptical consequences.  For this and other reasons, I regard both Evidential Internalism as merely a first 
pass view, and I hope to develop it further in future work.  I think the qualifications necessary to avoid 
implausible skeptical consequences are unlikely to affect the present discussion.
!  See, e.g., (Alston, 1986).52
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that one’s having justification to believe in the reliability of the transition ordinarily goes 
along with one’s having justification to believe in the reliability of the connection. 
However, there is once again an exception in the case of the transition from the belief that 
p to the belief that you believe that p.  Arguably but plausibly, anyone with the requisite 
concepts, time, and attention is in a position justifiably to believe that the process of 
inferring from p that one believes that p is a reliable one.    Yet it is only in special cases 53
of hyper-expertise about p that one has justification to believe that the fact that p is a 
reliable indicator that one believes that p.  So in most cases, the Inferential Internalist will 
license as justified an inference from p to the conclusion that one believes that p, while 
the Evidential Internalist will not. 
Two problems therefore confront the Inferential Internalist.  The first is that Inferential 
Internalism’s right-to-left direction has Transparency as a consequence.  If the objections 
presented above lead us to reject Transparency, then we must reject Inferential 
Internalism as well.  Now it could be replied on the inferentialist’s behalf that Inferential 
Internalism, as I have characterized it, is only a first pass view, and that those who are 
attracted to what it says in broad outline will wish to refine it.  Even if so, there is reason 
to worry that any refinement that avoids having Transparency as a consequence will leave 
in place an important explanatory problem.  Evidential Internalism gives us an elegant 
explanation of why inferences from the premise that p to the conclusion that one believes 
that p are typically unjustified:  It is because one typically lacks justification to believe 
that p is a reliable indicator that one believes that p.  Even if Inferential Internalism is 
modified to avoid licensing such inferences as justified, there is reason to worry that any 
modification sufficient to do so will be objectionably ad hoc.  Inferences from p to the 
conclusion that one believes that p are a paradigmatic example of a kind of inference 
where the verdicts of Inferential Internalism and Evidential Internalism come apart.  Any 
modification to Inferential Internalism that is tailored to make it agree with Evidential 
Internalism on these paradigmatic cases seems bound to be ad hoc. 
The second problem for Inferential Internalism concerns the motivation for its left-to-
right direction, which gives as a necessary condition for one to be justified in inferring 
from p to q that one have justification to believe that this inference is a reliable one.  To 
see the problem, we will need to consider briefly what the traditional motivation for this 
necessary condition is.  Traditionally, internalists have been struck by the intuitive 
illegitimacy of certain kinds of inferences that are licensed by orthodox reliabilists.  For 
example, concerning Mysterious Barometer it strikes many internalists as intuitively 
illegitimate for you to infer that the pressure is low from the fact that the barometer reads 
‘low’.  If you lack evidence concerning the reliability of a barometer, these internalists 
say, then the mere fact that the barometer is objectively reliable will not mean that you 
!  For further discussion, see (Shoemaker, 1996, esp.  Chs. 2 and 11) and (Setiya, MS).  Note that the claim 53
is only that anyone with the relevant capacities is in a position to have a justified belief that this inferential 
process is reliable, not that most people have this justified belief.
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are justified in making such an inference.  The necessary condition imposed by 
Inferential Internalism is intended to rule this inference unjustified—and it plausibly does 
so, since without justification to believe that the barometer is reliable, it seems you lack 
justification to believe that this inference is an instance of a reliable process.  The 
problem for the Inferential Internalist again concerns the explanation of why this 
inference is unjustified.  Intuitively, the reason why you cannot justifiably infer that the 
pressure is low from the barometer’s reading is that you cannot justifiably take the 
premise that the barometer reads ‘low’ to show that the conclusion that pressure is low is 
true.  And Inferential Internalism fails to capture this intuitive explanation.  This is 
demonstrated by the fact that it does not similarly rule as unjustified an inference from p 
to the conclusion that one believes that p, even though this inference is afflicted by the 
very same intuitive problem.  For as we have seen, even though the transition from a 
belief that p to the conclusion that one believes that p is a reliable one, it does not confer 
justification because you cannot justifiably take the fact that p to support that you believe 
that p.  Since the problem with this inference is the very same as the one afflicting the 
inference from the barometer’s reading to the conclusion that the pressure is low, any 
principle that adequately captures the problem with the latter inference ought to rule the 
former unjustified as well.  But Inferential Internalism does not do this.  For as we have 
already seen, the inference from p to the conclusion that you believe p meets the 
necessary condition imposed by Inferential Internalism.  The upshot is that even though 
Inferential Internalism correctly rules unjustified the inference from the barometer’s 
reading to the conclusion that the pressure is low, it does not properly explain why this 
inference is unjustified.  It is not unjustified because you fail to have justification to 
believe that the inference is reliable, as the Inferential Internalist says.  Instead, it is 
unjustified for the same reason that typical inferences from a proposition p to the 
conclusion that you believe that p are unjustified—because you are not justified in taking 
the premise of the inference to show that the conclusion is true.   54
!  I wish to thank Eli Alshanetsky, Dorit Bar-On, Ned Block, Paul Boghossian, Alex Byrne, Fabrizio 54
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